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The longstanding problem to understand if, why, and how objective functioning of the brain gives
rise to a subjective perspective has been, in the last few decades, commonly known as the hard
problem of consciousness. However, due to the strictly subjective and qualitative character of sub-
jective experience, it is difficult to get a firm grip on the problem itself, which led some philosophers
even to deny the very existence of the problem. In this paper, we point to a relation between the
quantity of information (i.e. Kolmogorov complexity) and the phenomenon of subjective experience.
In a thought experiment that we construct, the amount of information existing subjectively will be
significantly higher than the amount of information existing objectively. We argue that such a quan-
tifiable discrepancy clearly identifies one mathematically well-defined aspect of the hard problem
which, in turn, makes it at least much harder to deny its existence. If we take a stronger stance, this
aspect of the problem further undermines hopes that a satisfactory strictly physicalist explanation
of the subjective experience could be ever given.
INTRODUCTION
In his 1995 paper, David Chalmers has famously coined
the term “hard problem of consciousness” to address the
mystery of “why should physical processing give rise to a
rich inner life at all?” [1]. While it is the very existence
of subjective experience that is the essence of this conun-
drum, this existence is always exemplified by pointing to
qualitative manifestations of subjectivity: sensory expe-
riences (qualia), internal dialogue, thinking, feeling, etc.
Due to the strictly subjective and qualitative nature of
these manifestations, they elude precise definitions and,
in particular, any attempt to mathematical rigor. The
aim of this paper is to point out that, under certain cir-
cumstances, a well-defined mathematical quantity that
effectively measures the amount of information - the so-
called Kolmogorov complexity [2, 3] - can be used as a
quantitative indicator of the existence of the subjective
perspective. These “certain circumstances” are peculiar
in the sense that the objective amount of information ex-
isting in a system (a box, or the entire universe) is, in
these cases, manifestly lower than the amount of infor-
mation subjectively observed by an agent (who is a part
of the same system).
If and when such a discrepancy occurs, it should clearly
present a glaring issue: even those not familiar with
the information theory are accustomed to the fact that
the missing information must be then somewhere hid-
den. For example, it is intuitively clear that, no matter
how good the compression method is, the entire Holly-
wood movie production in the last 100 years cannot be
(losslessly) recorded on a single (700MB) compact disk
- and if such an ordinary CD could be indeed used to
play any Hollywood movie at our bidding, it would be
clear that the most part of the information is actually
hidden somewhere else, and not located on the CD. In
our case, if an agent observes more complexity in the
system than there objectively exists, then this difference
must be contained somewhere - and since this part of
the information is not objectively present, it then repre-
sents a well-defined quantity that exists only subjectively.
Consequently, if we can pinpoint a mathematically well-
defined entity that exists only subjectively (and not ob-
jectively), it becomes very hard to deny the existence
of the subjective perspective or to surmise that the lat-
ter is simply produced by objective processes alone. In
particular, in such circumstances, the difference between
agents with subjective experience and philosophical zom-
bies [4, 5] becomes even more apparent and clearly de-
fined: in the latter case, there simply is not any system of
information, i.e. any perspective in which there is more
information than objectively existing. Conversely, once
we acknowledge the existence of a perspective contain-
ing more information than objectively existing, we have
switched from philosophical zombies to agents with in-
ternal experience, and we have introduced a subjective,
that is, a non-objective realm.
The very fact that situations with more subjectively
than objectively existing information can occur, may at
first sound highly puzzling or even absurd. But, on closer
inspection, the phenomenon is not that surprising nor un-
expected: as we shall clarify, the missing information is
actually encoded in the “self-location” information pos-
sessed by the agent.1 However, once some naive intu-
itions and misconceptions are removed, it turns out that
this recognition does not resolve the problem at all. On
the contrary, it is rather that this particular informa-
tional aspect of the self-locating uncertainty was, to our
knowledge, unjustly neglected or glossed over. It empha-
sizes that the very existence of the internal information
system (one which is introspected), irrespective of any
additional phenomenal states or qualia, is deeply myste-
1 Notions of “self-locating beliefs” and “self-locating information”
come from the decision theory (e.g. see [6]), while the notion of
“self-locating uncertainty” is of great importance in many-worlds
interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics [7]. Our usage will
be closely related to that in MWI, as will become clear in the
context.
2rious. Namely, we will make it clear that, in principle,
an arbitrary amount of information can be hidden in this
self-location (e.g. equivalent to gigabytes of data) while,
at the same time, this information is absent from the
objective reality – a fact that cannot be easily ignored.
Just as in the case of the hypothetical CD containing
all of the movies, this information is real, indisputably
observed, and thus must be accounted for.
The example we will consider below will not presup-
pose any specific details about the physical universe: in
particular, as a thought experiment, it can be put ei-
ther in the context of classical physics, in the context of
quantum physics, or, in principle, in some other frame-
work. However, the significance of our conclusions is
much higher if the laws of physics are strictly determinis-
tic in a way that leads to the conservation of the quantity
of information (since all future states are already encoded
in the initial state). This class includes the case of classi-
cal physics2, as well as certain interpretations of quantum
mechanics. Of the latter, it is worth mentioning that this
problem of discrepancy between the Kolmogorov com-
plexity of objective versus subjective reality is strikingly
acute and instructive in the context of many-worlds in-
terpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics [9, 10], and
bears many implications both for this interpretation and
for the hard problem itself. Namely, this interpretation
tacitly allows that the objective state of the universe is
of exceedingly low complexity (since the interpretation
is deterministic and the initial state may be very sim-
ple), while we subjectively observe immense amounts of
information (so that essentially all information about the
observable universe - from human DNA to distant stars -
exists only subjectively, hidden in the self-location knowl-
edge). While we will add a few more remarks on MWI in
what follows, the missing information problem in MWI
context deserves to be analyzed in more detail and in its
own right, and thus we will treat this issue elsewhere.
In the following section we develop our thought experi-
ment. After that, we will discuss its implications, as well
as some potential objections to our reasoning (in particu-
lar, the relevance of the notion of “relative information”).
The final section is a brief summary.
THE LIBRARY OF BABEL THOUGHT
EXPERIMENT
As announced, the subject of our investigation in the
context of the hard problem will be the quantity of in-
formation, as expressed by Kolmogorov complexity [3].
In most simple terms, Kolmogorov complexity represents
the (least) amount of information (e.g. expressed in the
number of bits) required to fully specify an object. It
2 Excluding the zero-measure set of initial conditions that results
in Norton’s dome [8] type of situations.
is formally defined for sequences of symbols (bits) as the
length of the shortest computer program that reproduces
that precise sequence. Strictly speaking, it is defined up
to an additive constant (related to the particular choice
of the programming language or, more formally, to the
choice of the particular universal Turing machine), but
for our purposes, these and further mathematical details
will not be relevant.
In this context, it will be sufficient that Kolmogorov
complexity is a well-defined mathematical notion that
grasps our intuitive idea of how difficult (i.e. lengthy) it
is to fully specify an object. In our case, we will discuss
the complexity of physical objects, by considering the
Kolmogorov complexity of their full description. In order
to make the connection more concrete, we may imagine
being in possession of an ideal 3D printer, capable of
printing any physical object with arbitrary (or even ideal)
precision. (In the quantum-mechanical case, the printer
should be able to ideally prepare given allowed quantum
state.) The complexity of an object (i.e. the information
contained in that object) would then correspond to a
maximally compressed set of instructions for this printer,
required to create the object.
So defined complexity of an object, or more generally
of a physical system, is of a particular significance when
the laws of physics are deterministic.3 Namely, in a de-
terministic case, the state of a given isolated system at
any moment in future is completely determined by any
of its past states. In turn, this means that if we possess
the complete description of the initial state of the sys-
tem, and have full knowledge of the dynamical laws, we
are able to, in principle with arbitrary precision, compute
the state of the system at any given future moment. This
further means that Kolmogorov complexity of the sys-
tem state at any moment in the future cannot be greater
than the complexity of the initial state plus the length of
code that implements computation of the system’s tem-
poral evolution (and plus the length required to specify
that time instant with given precision). If, in addition,
the laws of physics are symmetric under time inversion
(as is the case both with Newtonian physics and with
Schrodinger’s equation), then also the past states of the
system can be computed as a function of any given fu-
ture state. In such cases, Kolmogorov complexity of an
isolated system, defined as a sum of the state description
plus the algorithm for time evolution (plus the length
of time parameter), becomes a conserved quantity. (We
stress that computational time and memory resources re-
quired to compute with arbitrary given precision the total
description of the system state at a given moment are ir-
relevant for the definition of the quantity of information.)
Conserved quantities are generally important properties
3 Strictly speaking, they should be also “effectively computable”
[11], but this is automatically satisfied for all physical theories of
interest.
3of any system. We will thus concentrate on these cases
when Kolmogorov complexity is a constant of motion and
thus a fixed property of the system.
Another important property of the Kolmogorov com-
plexity of an object is that it quantifies the total informa-
tion that can be derived from the object, limiting thus
the (explanatory) abilities of the object. For example,
if we can hear Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 but cannot
identify the source, it is not reasonable to seek the ex-
planation for the music among objects whose complexity
is lower than the complexity of the music piece (unless
we expect some additional source of information to exist
- e.g. radio waves broadcasting the music). In general,
it should be fairly obvious that no more information can
be drawn from the physical object than from its total
description. If the laws are deterministic, this also holds
for any future state of the system, which cannot con-
tain more information than the description of the ini-
tial state. For example, if the total description of the
object describes a simple ideal crystal lattice of a cubic
shape (with Kolmogorov complexity of the order of tens
of kilobytes), on close inspection of the object itself we
certainly cannot expect to find a hidden inscription of
Shakespeare’s Hamlet. This remains so even if wait a
bit, or manipulate the object in some sense: e.g. if we
cut the object, unless we do it in a way to introduce
the missing information (the text of Hamlet in this case)
by our external action. Hardly surprising conclusion, but
very important in what follows, is this: there are no more
Shakespeare’s verses in the actual object than there are in
its total description. What is less intuitively clear is that
this holds not only for any meaningful information but
also for any random information - the object itself can-
not help us generate a random number any more than its
description can. This can be most easily seen as follows:
whatever info we might gain from any interaction with
the physical object, we could equally well gain the same
info by simulating the same interaction on the computer,
starting from the object description. Needless to say that
all these conclusions remain valid also for a composite
system consisting of a few spatially separated objects.
Now it is time to specify the physical system of inter-
est here. We will consider an immensely long array of
equally spaced books which are identical in every minute
detail, apart from the printed content of the book. And
the content of the books will be the following. The first
book will be entirely filled by letter “A” and no other
character: 410 pages, each page of forty lines, each line
of eighty letters.4 The second book will be precisely the
same, of the same size, except for the very last letter that
will be “B”. The next book will have the letter “C” at the
end, and so on - in short, this arrangement will feature
4 Here we allude to Jorge Luis Borges’s short story “Library of
Babel”, and the book size is taken to be the same as there.
However, unlike in Borges’s story, in our case the books will be
perfectly arranged.
each possible sequence of 29 basic characters (26 letters of
the English alphabet, the period, the comma, and space)
covering these 410 pages, sorted in the strict lexicograph-
ical order. Altogether, 29410·40·80 books, that is, approx-
imately, one-followed-by-two-million-zeros of books. In
order to have an isolated system, we will take that the
books are enclosed in a stupendously long box, and let
them be in a perfect vacuum (alternatively, we may also
imagine that these books are the only objects in the uni-
verse of this thought experiment). The fact that such
an array could not even remotely fit into our observable
universe is, of course, of absolutely no relevance for our
thought experiment (actually, we could have chosen even
realistically smaller values, only at the cost of making our
main point less intuitively clear).
Next, we will consider the amount of information con-
tained in this system, i.e. its Kolmogorov complexity. To
reduce the complexity, we will take that each page is built
as a perfect crystal sheet of A4 size (120 x 297 x 0.1 mil-
limeters), made of some element that can form perfect
cubic crystal lattices (e.g. iron), and that the pages are
merely laid one over the other, with no cover pages. The
distance between adjacent books will always be the same,
e.g. exactly one meter, and all books will be identically
oriented. (In principle, we should also require that the
entire system is at zero temperature, but this and simi-
lar technical details are unlikely to influence our conclu-
sions.) Instead of using ink for printing, we may engrave
letters in the crystalline pages. In this way, we have as-
sured that the required instructions for 3D printing of all
these books become surprisingly simple, i.e. short: the
physical substance of each of the books can be now very
concisely specified in full detail, as well as their spatial
location. As for the content of the books, it is of even
lesser complexity: apart of some code needed to specify
the font of the letters, the program for printing the book
contents nearly reduces to a single “for loop” of the form
“for i = 1 to 29410∗40∗80 print(i)”. Because, obviously,
what is written in each book is just its ordinary num-
ber, written in the numeral system with base 29, where
basic characters take the role of digits. (Therefore, in a
programming pseudo-language, the algorithm for print-
ing the books is simply “move from first to the last book
and in each one print its ordinary number in the base 29
numeral system”.) It is likely that full instructions for
3D printing the entire immense array of these books can
be compressed into no more than a few tens of kilobytes.
The important question to be addressed is this: does
this box, full of books, contain “The Tragedy of Hamlet”?
Well, we have already concluded above that there is as
much Hamlet in the object as there is in its total descrip-
tion! Since the “for loop” that populates the contents of
the books contains no mention of the Danish prince or
anything alike, so the 3D printed object also cannot con-
tain anything like the text of Hamlet.
Yet, this is where our conclusions collide with our in-
tuition. First of all, somewhere in that vast row of books
is obviously an exact copy of The Tragedy of Hamlet,
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billions more with a few typos, extra spaces, or some
variations - all of them telling the drama of the Prince
of Denmark. But they are lost in the immense, meticu-
lously ordered junk. Not just lost in the ordinary sense
(of their location being forgotten/unknown), but lost in
the sense of informational, and thus in some sense lit-
eral, vanishing. There is absolutely nothing we can learn
about Hamlet if given these books: e.g. there is no way
to check what was the precise wording of the famous
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
than are dreamt of in your philosophy”, or no way even
to check the spelling of “Horatio”. Absolutely nothing
we can gain about Shakespeare’s drama that we had not
already known before. For, if there was anything to find
out from this line of books, then we could also get that
information by inspecting the printer instructions alone
(or maybe by simulating our actions on the computer).
But the instructions describing all the text in the books
contain only a single, utterly Hamletless, for-loop. To
find Hamlet in that mass of books, one would have to
be Shakespeare, and also to Shakespeare, all these books
could not have helped a bit to write this play, even if he
had time to rummage through them.
Nevertheless, our intuition objects: there is that per-
fect copy of Hamlet somewhere there, and we can clearly
imagine us standing there, in front of it, reading it, and
finding out the story of Hamlet. Is not it, in that sense,
very much real and existing?! Yet, for this to happen,
we would have to stand in front of it - namely, we would
have to move some number of meters from the beginning
of the box. This number of meters that we have chosen, if
written down in the basis 29 numerals, is exactly the text
of Hamlet - so, if we were asked in advance to choose the
position where we want to stand, we would have to spec-
ify it by writing down the precise copy of Hamlet. And
if we specify it in advance, then the Hamlet is there only
because we have introduced it inside the box, encoded in
our location.
Overall, this is a curious situation that the matter (a
hardcopy of the Hamlet) somehow exists without infor-
mation it should contain (the information about Hamlet).
Modern physics – from quantum mechanics, over relativ-
ity, black-hole physics and cosmology – teaches us that in-
formation is an essential notion, maybe even more sound
and basic than matter. Thus, whether it still makes any
sense to say that the copy of Hamlet exists, and in which
exactly sense, is rather dubious in our view, but this is
not the subject of our primary interest here. What suf-
fices for our purposes here is to conclude that there is
definitely no sense in which information about Hamlet
exists in these books. We are not an inch closer to the
story of Hamlet after printing all these books than we
were before.
Of course, this is so only as long as all the books are
totally identical in every other respect apart from the
content. If we put a single tick mark, or just a dot, on
any page of the “perfect Hamlet” copy, the Hamlet sud-
denly pops fully into existence, in every common sense.
Namely, if we consider the Kolmogorov complexity of
the entire box now, there must also be the information
about the position of that tick mark. And this infor-
mation on the whereabouts of the tick mark cannot be
supplied without identifying the book where it is marked,
i.e without telling (encoding) the whole story of Hamlet.
We cannot do any better by attempts to specify only the
position of the tick mark, e.g. its distance from the box
beginning - since to spell this precise distance we must
again write down the text of Hamlet and interpret it as
the number of meters. In any case, to 3D print this tick
mark (or a single notch) along with the books, we must
enlarge our instruction code at least for the length of
(compressed) text of Hamlet. And if we do so, the infor-
mation becomes really there: just as much in the printing
instructions as in the row of the actual books.
In general, singling out, in any sense, any of the books,
takes an amount of information pretty much equivalent
to the information contained in that book, and thus it
adds the same amount to the printing instructions. We
emphasize that Hamlet is in no sense special here. We,
of course, do not think special only in comparison to, for
example, Macbeth, but also in comparison to any other,
non-sensical or completely randomly filled book (a gen-
uinely random text would be totally non-compressible
and thus would carry an even higher Kolmogorov com-
plexity increase than any proper English text). As al-
ready stated, this array of printed books cannot help us
even to generate a random sequence of characters, let
alone to read works of art. The former might not be so
obvious, as someone may be tempted to hastily think: “I
can pick any of the books and there will be 410 pages
long random sequence”. But, of course, all the random-
ness we gain from that book was already contained in
our “random” choice of the book, hence this random in-
formation we already had to “invest” - and nothing to
gain.
To proceed further with our thought experiment, we
note that the information about Hamlet (as well as the
information from every other book) will still be absent
from the box even if we add some stuff to accompany
each of the books, as long as the uniformity is not bro-
ken. For example, we might add in front of each book an
identical camera that will just stand and take photos of
pages. We can also add a mechanism to turn pages and
activate the camera so that each page gets photographed.
Granted, these new elements will make the box contents
certainly more complex - with complexity increased for
the description of the camera and the mechanism - but all
the contents of the books will be still reproduced by the
same trivial “for loop” that has no mention of Hamlet.
Nothing in this sense is changed even if we add an identi-
cal computer to each camera, that will use some artificial
intelligence (AI) to do the optical character recognition of
the book in front of it and to digitally store recorded in-
formation in text form. Neither the fact that now we also
have a digital copy of each book in the computer has any
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tion present in this box will be the sum of complexities
of the book fabric, the camera, and the computer, plus
the “for loop” algorithm for repeating this setup for each
book and for populating the book contents. This is not
only sufficient to 3D print the entire box contents, but
at the same time, this is all the information that is in
principle obtainable from this box. In other words, there
is no sense in which information about Hamlet exists in
this box, even after these modifications.
Unless – and now we come to the main point – the
idea of “strong AI” is true. Unless the AI in the camera
is such that it is “conscious” in the sense we commonly
understand this word. In the sense that “there is some-
one in there, looking”, or that “it is something like to
be that camera AI while taking photos” (paraphrasing
T. Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat” [12]). For, if
there is a subjective perspective of the camera, then this
perspective is quite different. Take the camera facing
the perfect copy of Hamlet. To help our intuition, let
us call this “AI-equipped camera with a mechanism for
flipping the pages” a robot, or an agent. What is this
agent’s description of the box contents? Curiously, this
agent’s description is necessarily more complex than the
objective description of the entire box.
Namely, to fully specify the physical system inside the
box from the perspective of this agent then, in addition
to the printing instructions, we must also include the en-
tire text of Hamlet in the description, since the Hamlet
is what the agent is looking at! Or, if it might seem
unclear whether the printing instructions should be con-
sidered as accessible to this agent and thus truly a part
of his internal information system, we might consider the
agent facing one even more interesting book. Among
the books, there is also a book that contains the perfect
text of Hamlet followed by the precise printing instruc-
tions used for the 3D printer. For this book to exist it
is sufficient that the book size is large enough to fit both
Hamlet and the instructions. Even if 410 pages is not
enough for this, we can easily extend the length of the
books in the thought experiment to an arbitrary required
length (we can also extend the character set to include
numbers, in order to have a more natural encoding of
the printer instructions). It is only important to notice
that the extension of the size (and the number) of the
books, even for orders and orders of magnitude, would
enlarge the instruction set just marginally – all we need
to do is to increase the limit of the for loop (which can be
done very efficiently, e.g. by setting it in the exponential
form, like 1010
1010
). Therefore, inside there is a book that
contains both Hamlet and the full printing instructions
while, objectively, the information about everything that
exists in the box fits already in the printing instructions
alone. If we now consider the agent facing this special
book, there is no more doubt that this agent (taking into
account only what he reads from his book) subjectively
possesses more information than there objectively exists
in the entire box system.
But how is it possible that this agent possesses more
information than there is and than could be, even in prin-
ciple, extracted from this box? And how can he be aware
of the text of Hamlet if we have concluded that there is
no sense in which information about Hamlet exists in this
box? While we can easily identify that the information
about the text of Hamlet has an actual source in the
information about the “self-location” of the agent, this
hardly solves the informational mystery - how does this
information come about? How can it originate in the ob-
jective reality of the box, if this objective reality has no
trace of this information?
Let us recapitulate the situation once more: if the cam-
era remains just a camera, so that it makes no sense to
speak about its subjective perspective, everything is clear
- there is no sense in which information about Hamlet ex-
ists in the box. However, if the 3D-printed AI camera has
become “conscious”, and “it is something like to be that
camera”, then there must also be an internal perspective
to this camera, an internal information system, subjec-
tive for the camera. If such subjective experience of the
camera exists, it somehow must incorporate information
from the book the camera is facing: and that is the in-
formation about The Tragedy of Hamlet, in spite that
this information objectively does not exist at all in the
box (or in the entire universe, if we take nothing else to
exists apart from this box).
Since the subjective perspective of a camera is not
quite an intuitive concept, it might be tempting to go
yet another step further in our thought experiment, and
to replace the robotic camera-agent with a human agent:
in principle, it should be possible to 3D print an iden-
tical human clone in front of each book. However, one
should be careful about what information is introduced
in the box along with the human agents. Assuming that
the agent is 3D printed in adult age, she should arguably
also possess standard human faculties, like the ability
to read, or even some level of familiarity with works of
Shakespeare. In spite of this caveat (and taking care not
to contaminate box interior with much relevant informa-
tion), it seems instructive to consider two hypothetical
scenarios.
The first is that, for any reason, such printed agents
are philosophical zombies, with no internal perspective.
In spite the fact that each of the agents might have a
certain behavioral reaction to the information presented
in her book (e.g. get prompted to read parts of the text
aloud), this will only be an act of an impersonal mecha-
nism and there still would be no information about Ham-
let in the box, in any possible sense. Namely, since the
time evolution is deterministic, the behavior of the agents
cannot change the information initially present in the
box - and this initial information contained only the for-
loop and no mention of Hamlet. This initial information
is merely transcribed into the objective behavior of the
agents, more precisely, into their motions. This is no dif-
ferent than copying book content into the digital form by
the camera-agents since, by the definition of philosophi-
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apart from the “objective” one, i.e. there are no subjec-
tive systems of information. In this zombie-case, there
would be no informational puzzle of how did the infor-
mation about Hamlet come into being, since there still
would be no trace of the information about Hamlet in
the box.
The other scenario is that the human clones would be
conscious in the usual sense. While there are much vague-
ness and dispute about what “being conscious” exactly
means, it is at least commonly agreed that it entails the
existence of some internal representation of the exter-
nal world, in other words, the existence of an internal
information system. We are somehow “aware” of this
internal information system and that is the basic experi-
ence of “self-presence” or “self-existence” (or of “being”).
This experience in certain sense precedes other manifes-
tations of subjective experience (such as qualia, internal
dialogue, etc.) and, when combined with sensory inputs,
it necessitates the information about “self-location” in
the universe. Namely, that entity we name “conscious-
ness” is strictly localized to only one of the agents and is
accessing sensory perceptions of that agent alone. This
fact of localization therefore effectively picks one of the
books (by picking one of the agents) and, from the per-
spective of this internal information system, it results in
the appearance of a huge amount of (random) informa-
tion from that book. Consequently, this information from
the book is now an integral part of the data in this inter-
nal system, i.e. of the full description of the entire uni-
verse (or of the entire box) from the perspective of that
agent. If we again consider the human agent who is fac-
ing that Hamlet copy supplemented with the full printing
instructions, it is clear that the Kolmogorov complexity
of information in her internal subjective reference system
surpasses Kolmogorov complexity of the objective, exter-
nal description of the box (exactly for the length of the
compressed text of Hamlet).
Could it be that this excess of information simply
vanishes when we take into account the global picture?
Namely, if the copy of Hamlet was the only book in the
box, the existence of the information about Hamlet would
be indisputable. It is only in the totality of the box, with
the myriads of books taken together, that this informa-
tion vanishes. Could it be a similar case with the internal
knowledge of Hamlet, possessed by the agent facing it?
May it be that, once we take into account all agents to-
gether, that this information also vanishes? Again, this is
exactly what happens in the hypothetical case of philo-
sophical zombies. While each clone-agent may have a
distinct behavioral response to the presented book, it is
due to the totality of these responses and the fact that,
as a whole, they merely represent the same “for loop”
used to populate books only translated into a “for loop”
describing agents’ motions, that objectively, there is still
no trace of “Hamlet” in that collective motion. However,
it is much different if the agents are not zombies, and if
we allow that each of them possesses a personal, subjec-
tively experienced system of information. In that case,
each of the agents can take into account perspectives of
other agents (recognizing that “each of the clones sees
her book”), but this still is not going to cancel-out the
first-person realization that “I see the Tragedy of Hamlet
in front of me”. There is simply no “for loop” that will
reproduce information existing in the subjective system
of the agent facing Hamlet, either in the presence or in
the absence of other agents.
IMPLICATIONS AND CAVEATS
To summarize, in the “Library of Babylon” situation
that we have analyzed, the presence of the subjective ex-
perience of the involved agents was revealed through the
existence of informational systems that possessed more
information than the totality of information objectively
present in the entire physical system. Thus we arrive at
the main conclusion of this paper: Self-locating informa-
tion possessed by a conscious agent can be of arbitrary
high Kolmogorov complexity, while this information nev-
ertheless may not exist at all in the objective description
of the physical reality. As the result, agent’s subjective
representation of the universe (or of the physical system
of which the agent is part) may be of greater Kolmogorov
complexity than the full impersonal and objective de-
scription of reality (i.e. of the physical system).
Immediate consequence is that, in these situations,
this discrepancy between the subjective and objective
amounts of information can be used as a way to clarify
and define the difference between philosophical zombies
and conscious agents (in spite of indistinguishability of
behavior).
Next, it is worthwhile to discuss if, and to what ex-
tent, this conclusion is further relevant for the various
attempts to solve the hard problem of consciousness. We
believe that, at the very least, the analyzed informational
aspect lets us appreciate more the mystery of the subjec-
tive experience. While notions such as “belief”, or even
“pain” might be sort of vague, unmeasurable and dif-
ficult to scientifically define, so that some philosophers
see them as nothing but “folk psychology” that should
be simply eliminated from a serious description of reality
[13], the details about the fate of the Danish prince seem
far more factual and difficult to ignore. And these details
just do not exist in our settings if there is no subjective
experience, since they were never put in the box. Only if
the subjective experience truly exists, so does the story
Hamlet, in minds of some of the agents.
For this reason, we think that the discrepancy between
the subjectively perceived and objectively existing infor-
mation makes the illusionist (eliminativist) attempts to
explain (or explain away) the consciousness (e.g. [14–17])
further implausible. Again, insisting that there is no
truly such thing as subjective perspective, or that the
latter is in certain sense merely an illusion and that the
objective, third-person account is sufficient to describe
7reality, is here equivalent to insisting that there is just
no sense in which any information about Hamlet exists
in the box. But, this is hardly plausible because, contrary
to this, we just know that if we happened to be that one of
these clones facing Hamlet and leafing through the copy,
we would, beyond any doubt, obtain some information
from the book and that information would be very much
real – at least in some sense. We know “what-it-is-like”
to know about Hamlet. Unlike other more basic phenom-
enal states, this one also entails a lot of information, so
there can hardly be any confusion about its existence.5
Hence, if the clones have the standard human properties,
some of them must also be in the state of “knowing about
Hamlet”, i.e. there must exist a perspective in which in-
formation about Hamlet exists. Therefore, there is less
and less room to deny the existence of the subjective
experience, as of something puzzling and qualitatively
different from the strictly objective reality. Accordingly,
the problem to explain why this internal perspective ex-
ists – known, in essence, as the hard problem – becomes
even more difficult to ignore in this context.
And the prospect to explain this subjective perspective
as emerging from the objective physical properties alone
also gets grimmer in the light of this information paradox.
Namely, in situations of the “library of Babylon” type,
the problem with the emergence paradigm becomes more
pronounced since this internal perspective is even quan-
titatively transcending the external, objective one - it
contains a part of the information that is not objectively
there. How comes that someone can subjectively have
more information than objectively exist in the entire uni-
verse, if the subjectivity is merely a logical and necessary
consequence of the objective reality? Besides, can the
experience of contemplating about Hamlet’s dilemma be
truly derived from the Hamletless objective reality? As in
our earlier example with Beethoven’s symphony: lack of
information about Hamlet in our view demonstrates that
the objective reality of the box alone has no explanatory
power to explain the appearance of the subjective per-
spective of the agent reading Hamlet. We see this puzzle
as yet another illustration of the same “explanatory gap”,
often pointed out by the promoters of the hard problem:
the gap between the objective physical processes in the
brain and the subjective experiences which these pro-
cesses purportedly should explain. Surely, it is possible
to deduce (from the objectively available data) what this
subjective perspective of the given agent would contain
(in this case, that it would indeed contain information
about Hamlet), if we first take for granted that this sub-
jective perspective exists. But this has nothing to do
with an explanation of why this perspective should exist
5 Admittedly, in principle it is possible even to deny this internal
reality of “knowing about Hamlet” state, in a similar manner
as some philosophers can doubt the existence of pain. But due
to the well-defined and nontrivial informational content that the
former carries, this seems additionally unconvincing.
in the first place, or how it could come about. And this
explanation is farther away once we recognize that the
appearance of that subjective perspective would have to
bring the story of Hamlet into existence, out of “infor-
mational” thin air.
We are aware that a number of relatively obvious ob-
jections can be given both to our main conclusion and
to our inferences regarding the physicalist approaches to
the hard problem. To start with, our entire analysis is
contingent upon the ideal uniformity both of the array
of the books and of the environment. Indeed, if there is
any contamination of the box interior by unwanted in-
formation, no matter random or not, the entire construc-
tion becomes dubious. While this is not only preclud-
ing any real-life realization of the described setup6 (e.g.
as it requires total isolation, perfect vacuum, zero tem-
perature), but also raises questions of whether, even in
principle, it makes sense to speak of ideal precision of the
initial configuration (personified by the imaginary ideal
3D printer). For example, all distances must be exact to
infinite precision, for the Kolmogorov complexity of the
system to stay constrained and precise. These require-
ments further narrow down the list of physical theories to
which our conclusions apply – not only that the theories
should be deterministic, but also must not contain hid-
den variables (e.g. these considerations probably make
no sense in the context of de Broigle-Bohm pilot wave
interpretation of QM).
Nonetheless, we do not think that there is anything
in general that precludes the possibility, at least in prin-
ciple, to have this limited or at least a well-controlled
amount of information in a physical system. For exam-
ple, we find our conclusions applicable in the context of
classical physics. But much more interestingly and im-
portantly, there is a serious contemporary scientific view
of the universe, even quite a popular one, that assumes
the “library of Babylon” type of situation to be a reg-
ular, daily occurrence. This is the many-worlds inter-
pretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (actually, it was
the search for the roots of missing information problem
in MWI that initially led us to consider this more gen-
eral case). Namely, according to MWI, not only that the
imagined library of Babylon can be actually generated,
but it is quite practically feasible, easy even with con-
temporary technology. What we need is only a relatively
modest number of random quantum events with two pos-
sible outcomes of equal probability (e.g. 410x40x80x5 of
z-spin measurements of a particle with spin along the x-
axis). These outcomes are then interpreted as bits, con-
verted into letters of a book (5 bits are sufficient to en-
code 29 characters, 3 extra combinations can also encode
space symbol) and read by an agent (either a robot or
6 We stress that, however, the length of the array is not a real issue
- the same conceptual problem with information arrises already
with two books, it is only less intuitively obvious.
8human). According to MWI, this relatively simple proce-
dure will result in the generation of stunning 32410x40x80
copies of the agent reading the book, where each instance
is absolutely identical in every minute detail apart from
the contents of the books (and the latter take all possible
sequences of 410x40x80 letters). And these copies are, by
the MWI proponents, usually imagined quite literally (as
equally coexisting in the richness of the Hilbert space) –
essentially in a similar way as human clone-agents coexist
in our library of Babylon example.
But the same problem in MWI is actually far more
drastic and intuitively striking than in classical settings.
From the viewpoint of the MWI formalism, it is in prin-
ciple possible for the initial state of the universe (even of
our universe) to be of extremely low Kolmogorov com-
plexity. It could be such an orderly configuration of par-
ticles/fields that its description can fit on a CD (or even
on an old floppy drive) and still be – according to MWI
– consistent with observational data. Namely, billions of
years later such a simple initial state nevertheless may
evolve into a state representing a well-defined superposi-
tion of myriads of worlds, of which one could be exactly
like ours. But since MWI assumes strictly deterministic
(and time inversion invariant) laws of motion, the de-
scription of this myriad of worlds, each of them being
of unfathomable complexity taken alone, when taken to-
gether can still fit on that single CD (along with an algo-
rithm that computes the time evolution). This is possible
in exactly the same way as each of the billions of books
in our library of Babylon contains a lot of information
when taken separately, but very little when taken all to-
gether. Therefore, many-worlds interpretation, surpris-
ingly, allows that our present universe objectively con-
tains no trace of information not only about Hamlet, but
also no information about any human affairs, about any
human at all (e.g. about human or any other DNA) or
even about Earth itself.7 If information about all the
richness we see around does not objectively exist, and
yet we perceive it, it must be that all this information
exists only subjectively, encoded in our “self-location”
within the Hilbert space containing uncountable worlds.
The most surprising is actually that MWI proponents
are either ignoring or overlooking this problem, boldly
claiming that what they defend is an objectivist interpre-
tation that introduces no further assumptions apart from
the main deterministic law of motion (i.e. Schrodinger’s
equation). In the context of our thought experiment, it
already becomes obvious that the MWI idea existentially
relies upon a very concrete proposal about the solution to
the hard problem. Namely, they tacitly assume that sub-
jective perspective and subjective experience – i.e. those
7 Note that this is not possible in the context of classical physics
where trivially simple initial conditions are very unlikely to lead
to huge observable complexity (since there is only “one world”
according to the classical physics and no additional ones that
could “cancel out” the visible complexity).
responsible to bring into existence information about all
these rich visible structures around us – must sponta-
neously and necessarily arise as a consequence of specific
changes in values of certain parts of the total wavefunc-
tion. These “parts of the wavefunction” which exhibit
certain patterns of form and dynamics, are then named
“conscious agents”. Curiously, this counter-intuitive be-
lief is not in MWI taken to be an additional postulate,
but is understood to be a logical necessity which MWI
supporters do not deem necessary even to plausibly sub-
stantiate, let alone prove, in spite that entire interpreta-
tion crucially hinges upon this.
This information problem in many world interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics actually has many more im-
portant and specific aspects, and thus deserves to be dis-
cussed in its own right – which we intend to do elsewhere.
But a takeaway relevant for the present paper is that the
amount and content of information that is absent from
the objective reality and present in subjective experience
can be far more drastic than a content of a literary novel:
objective reality may not contain even any indication of
a human or a brain, and yet there can be a subjective
reality existing and observing all the intricate details of
human biology (with or without mention of Hamlet).
Another, ostensibly more serious objection to our con-
clusions would be the following. While we have estab-
lished that the information content of the considered sys-
tems is a constant of motion (due to deterministic laws of
physics), this still does not mean that the amount of in-
formation, or its content, is not a relative quantity. For
example, while the momentum of an isolated physical
system is a conserved quantity, its value depends upon
the frame of reference. Could it be that any paradox
here dissolves, if we take this into account? Moreover,
it is very natural to see information as a relative notion.
While it would be hard and unusual to define informa-
tion as a function of position (i.e. coordinate), it is rather
standard to see it as a property of a system relative to
another system (relative information), especially in the
context of physical correlations. If we define information
in this way, then the information possessed by the agent
facing Hamlet - that is, the information relative to this
agent - simply contains the text of Hamlet. At the same
time, the information existing relative to the systems ex-
ternal to the box (e.g. relative to the 3D printer), con-
tains only the printing instructions, no Hamlet. Mystery
solved?
We do not think so. Changing the definition can hardly
remove the explanatory gap that we observed. We must
reiterate our conclusions: it still holds that the only
things that objectively exist in the box are just those that
we have 3D printed - and there is not a trace of Shake-
speare in the printed reality in the box. On the other
hand, within the same box, there is, somehow, someone
reading and pondering over Shakespeare’s verses. There-
fore, contrary to our expectations, these verses are very
much real: we can easily imagine what it is like to read
Hamlet (or any other literary work). If we are indeed
9reading it, there is no doubt that the information we
have just read is also real in some sense (e.g. we can
clearly evoke it in our mind). Thus, since this happens
in the box, then information about Hamlet is in some
definite sense real inside the box, in spite of the fact it
was not put there in the first place and that it could not
spontaneously appear. This matter-of-fact about the ex-
perienced reality of information about Hamlet cannot be
a matter of definition. And the puzzling contradiction,
therefore, remains as long as we recognize only objective
reality and only the third-person perspective: informa-
tion about Hamlet then must not exist at all, since -
regardless of any definition - all objective information
written in the books can be accounted for by a for loop,
without a mention of the Shakespeare’s work. Defining
information as relative per se only means that “was there
a subjective perspective of the agent facing Hamlet, this
perspective would contain information about Hamlet and
not something else”.
On the other hand, if this information about Hamlet
really exists in the box, in spite of not being a part of the
objective reality, it only means that the information must
exist within some “subjective reality”. In our view, this
new category cannot be introduced within the physicalist
framework by a mere formal (re)definition of the notion
“information”. It takes a deeper modification: a postu-
late that a perspective different from the objective one is
present (at least) in certain situations and in a relation to
certain physical subsystems (i.e. to “conscious” agents).
Once the existence of this new perspective, i.e. of the
“subjective perspective” is postulated, its contents can
be recognized as the information relative to this agent.
Therefore, one way to explain the observed disagree-
ment between the subjective and objective amounts of
information is to extend the underlying ontology in or-
der to incorporate this internal information system (i.e.
subjective perspective) as something correlated with, but
not logically derivable from the objective description of
the reality. A further step of axiomatic simplification
would be to recognize that there is actually no need to
postulate the existence of any “objective perspective” per
se, since the third-person perspective is, in practice, al-
ways again a subjective perspective of some other agent.
In this view, ontological reality would be granted only
to subjective perspectives, and the real question would
be how these perspectives (i.e. internal information sys-
tems attached to various agents) can be interrelated in a
consistent manner.
Another approach would be to violate the conserva-
tion of information by giving up determinism. Indeed, if
there is a frequent influx of huge amounts of random in-
formation, our entire analysis and conclusions would be
no longer applicable.
Finally, we note that the collapse postulate of quantum
mechanics can be seen in this light as a combination of
both of these ideas. First, the collapse postulate tacitly
implies the existence of an internal perspective (the one
from which the measurement is performed) and, there-
fore, this internal perspective can be seen as effectively
introduced by this postulate. Secondly, the measurement
outcomes, as occurring from this internal perspective, are
well defined and inherently random, thus they are intro-
ducing fresh amounts of information and are increasing
Kolmogorov complexity of the internal description of re-
ality. In this sense, the collapse postulate of QM can
be recognized as a step towards the solution to the hard
problem of consciousness. As for the particular puzzle
of the subjective information that is objectively missing,
which was the subject of this paper – it all but solves
it. However, a deeper and much more difficult question,
with numerous possible answers, still lingers: to which
entities, systems or agents is this “subjective perspec-
tive” granted?
SUMMARY
The subject of exploration in this paper was the dis-
crepancy, occurring under certain conditions, between
the information subjectively possessed by an agent and
the totality of information objectively existing in the
physical system to which the agent belongs. We pointed
out that, surprisingly, the amount of information existing
subjectively (i.e. its Kolmogorov complexity) can surpass
by an arbitrary extent the amount of information existing
objectively. We explicated this phenomenon by devising
the “library of Babylon” thought experiment and dis-
cussed its relation to the hard problem of consciousness.
Our main conclusions were: i) the phenomenon of the
missing information is a curiously quantifiable manifesta-
tion of the hard problem of consciousness, and, as such,
can be also used to clarify, from yet another aspect,
the difference between conscious agents and philosophical
zombies; and ii) this informational puzzle seem to further
diminish the prospect of ever finding fully physicalist ex-
planation of the subjective experience. Furthermore, we
identified postulating the subjective perspective and in-
troduction of chance in physical dynamics as two possible
solutions to the presented conundrum.
We have also identified that a particularly severe and
relevant manifestation of this problem, deserving a de-
tailed analysis, arises in the context of the many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This aspect will
be the subject of our future study.
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